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This paper seeks to explore the dynamics of contemporary authoritarian populism from a historical 
perspective, relying on the approaches of Durkheim’s experimental sociology and Levinas’s ethical 
phenomenology. By reading the works of these two thinkers in concert, a pathology is exposed within 
this particular form of politics in that the State must necessarily close itself off to the critique of 
exteriority. Our reading of Durkheim explores the social pathology of nationalism while our reading 
of Levinas demonstrates the philosophical dimension of this pathology as the inevitable outcome of 
any philosophical thinking which privileges ontology above all else. The way these thinkers address 
these themes can serve as a guide as we attempt to overcome the same pathology today in various 
forms of authoritarian populism that adopt the same mentalities and methods utilized by past forms 
of this corrupted idealism. Keywords: nationalism, ontology, populism, Durkheim, Levinas. 
 
Introduction 
One of the great social theorists of our time passed away in July of 2019. Ágnes Heller 
dedicated her life to shedding philosophical illumination on complex political and social 
phenomena and in her last years she deployed her considerable talents in direct opposition to the 
politics of Viktor Orbán, the current prime minister of Hungary. Heller’s legacy is that of a 
political critic precisely because she refused to be drawn into philosophical dilemmas in which 
opposing capitalism necessarily meant dogmatically supporting Marxism. As a survivor of both 
the Nazi Holocaust and the Stalinist purges in occupied Hungary, Heller’s primary political 
commitment was an opposition to totalitarianism in all its forms. Her first-hand experiences with 
the barbarism of both left and right totalitarian governments lead Heller to build a career as an 
outspoken critic of all forms of political totality. 
One of the deep motivations of her work is the view that while philosophy has long 
engaged with conceptions of evil as it has been formulated by religious thought, in the 
contemporary world (beginning with Auschwitz) “demonic” evil manifests exclusively as 
political evil. Against Hannah Arendt’s conception of the banality of evil, Heller argues that evils  
committed or enabled by “demonic” agents become radical only when married to practical 
political power. She notes that Nero, for example, “was a murderer on a grand scale because as 
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Emperor of Rome he had the power to murder” (Heller 2011, 24). As the technology of cruelty 
evolved from Nero’s flames to the furnaces of Auschwitz, the scale of atrocity within reach of 
demonic figures expanded exponentially. This leads to the current situation in which “modern 
demons are in full bloom only in the situation of power” (Heller 2011, 27). Heller’s approach 
shows that philosophy is uniquely suited to exposing the machinations of evil, and further, that 
in our time the evil most urgently vital to oppose is found in the political sphere of human life. 
This is why, even in her final philosophical pursuits, Heller remained firmly fixed on opposing 
and challenging the politics of Orbán. 
Heller’s analysis of Orbán, which she offered in an interview on August of 2018, less than 
a year before her death, can help us orient our discussion of authoritarian populism here. When 
asked if she considered Orbán to be a “populist” she pronounced her diagnosis of his particular 
pathology as follows: 
I do not like the term populist as it is used in the context of Viktor Orbán, because 
it does not say anything. Populists rely typically on poor people. Orbán uses 
nationalistic vocabulary and rhetoric, he mobilizes hatred against the stranger and 
the alien, but it has nothing to do with populism. It has to do with the right-wing, 
but this is also questionable, because Orbán is a man who is interested only in 
power… From the time he became the prime minister of Hungary, Orbán was 
always interested in concentrating all the power in his hands. I would describe 
him as a tyrant. He is a tyrant because nothing can happen in Hungary that he 
does not want, and everything that he wants is carried through in Hungary. This 
is a very tyrannical rule… Everyone who is under Orbán must serve him and must 
agree with him. No counter opinion is tolerated because this is a mass society, not 
a class society (Heller 2018). 
This mentality of total concentration of power that Heller diagnoses in Orbán is certainly not 
limited to Hungarian politics nor is it only found within western countries. Rather, this same 
pathology can be seen as a worldwide movement that has encompassed China, Russia, Egypt, 
Turkey, Brazil, England and the United States. Heller remained committed throughout her life to 
the task of deploying the full force of philosophical rigor against this pathology and the kind of 
tyranny she denounced in figures such as Orbán. 
But here we might take issue with Heller’s reluctance, in the passage cited above, to 
identify the populist element of what she calls Orbán’s mobilization of “hatred against the 
stranger and the alien,” which she argues “has nothing to do with populism”. In our view, Heller 
underestimates the way that contemporary authoritarian populism mobilizes and exploits 
contempt for those who are ethnically or culturally different from the hegemonic majority, not as 
an incidental route to power but as a formal definitive characteristic of the movement. As will be 
developed below, this exploitation is not as an incidental characteristic but rather is a necessary 
and defining methodology of the movement. Further, this appeal to the basest aspects within the 
human soul is inseparable from the particular kind of right-wing authoritarian populism that 
Orbán represents and goes to the heart of the entire tradition of exclusionary nationalist populism 
which can only comprehend social unity in terms of hegemonic cultural solidarity. 
 In discussing the kinds of solidarity which unite and divide the social order, we might 
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well begin with the work of Émile Durkheim. While Durkheim is mostly known for his formal 
experimental sociology, he was a politically active scholar who, like Heller, deployed the full 
force of his academic research against the most serious political challenge of his day. For 
Durkheim, that challenge was the rising force of nationalism in the early part of the twentieth 
century. In the first part of this paper we will explore Durkheim’s very specific account of this 
particular pathology. In the second part we will attempt to orient how this pathology relies on an 
appeal to “elemental feelings” among the populace as an unmistakable component of past and 
present forms of exclusionary nationalist populism. 
Durkheim Against Nationalism 
 As one of the founders of classical sociology, Durkheim was primarily preoccupied with 
the dynamic forms of social solidarity that rise and fall with historical and cultural changes. 
While his work rarely addresses the particular political manifestations or exploitation of these 
kinds of solidarity, we can see how these elements converge in his brief 1914 (republished in 
English in 1915) propaganda pamphlet “Germany above All,” written against rising German 
Nationalism at the outset of the First World War and. There, Durkheim elaborates a view of a 
particular kind of nationalistic politics that persists today in contemporary forms of 
authoritarian populism. Dominick LaCapra explains the context of the pamphlet within 
Durkheim’s thought: 
One important problem which the propagandistic World War I pamphlet Germany 
above All emphasized was the crisis generated by a conflict between legal 
imperatives and the demands of a humanistic ethic. Although the severity of this 
conflict challenged his optimistic evolutionary assumptions about the non- 
authoritarian and democratic course of law and government in modern society, 
Durkheim's answer was unequivocal. In contrast to the school of juridical 
positivism in Germany, which had exercised some influence on his early thought, 
Durkheim without hesitation placed the humanistic conscience collective of modern 
society above legal duties to the state (LaCapra 2001, 87). 
This interest in the conflict between legal obligation and ethical obligation is a vital theme that 
gets to the heart of the mentality of contemporary nationalism. This mentality harbors a deep 
belief that the ethical order of human life can and must be subordinated to a conception of legal 
accountability, which is more easily manageable by the State’s legal apparatus. What this means 
is that ethics presents a threat to the authoritarian State as a realm that exists beyond its complete 
control, unlike the legislative and judicial realms which remain within the self-contained logic of 
the authoritarian State. Durkheim’s rejection of this absolute conception of the State rests on an 
account of the primacy of collective moral consciousness, which he develops in great detail in the 
pamphlet. Durkheim advocates for an almost Kantian position of European cosmopolitanism 
against which Germany had rebelled. He emphatically accuses Germany of leaving the great 
family of civilized people that comprises European society: 
It is beyond belief, they say, that Germany, which yesterday was a member of the 
great family of civilized peoples, which even played amongst them a part of the 
first importance, has been capable of giving so completely the lie to the principles 
of human civilization. It is not possible that those men, with whom we used to 
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consort, whom we held in high regard, who belonged without any reservation to 
the same moral community as we ourselves, have been capable of becoming those 
savage creatures, aggressive and unconscionable, whom we hold up to public 
indignation (Durkheim 1915, 3-4). 
Durkheim goes on to examine the way in which this withdrawal from collective civilized morality 
can be understood through a particular German mentality embodied in the work of Heinrich 
Treitschke. Durkheim explains Treitschke’s views of an exaggerated independence released from 
all limitation and reservation that culminates in the absolute State. Relying on this conception of 
exaggerated independence of the absolute State, Durkheim notes that for Treitschke, “the State is 
autarkès (self-sufficient), in the sense which the Greek philosophers gave to that word; it must be 
completely self-sufficient; it has, and ought to have, need only of itself, to exist and to maintain 
itself; it is an absolutism (8, translation modified). This definition of the State as absolute self-
sufficiency, of the utter closing off to the critique of exteriority, is the foundation of Treitschke’s 
political theory and serves as the forerunner to contemporary populist movements of radical 
exaggerated nationalist sovereignty. 
Durkheim focuses on Treitschke’s rejection of international law, or more specifically, his 
view that international law or treaties cannot be binding since a State cannot admit an authority 
superior to itself. Unlike contracts between individuals, who can and must yield to the superior 
authority of the State, contracts between States can have no such external force of law. Durkheim 
summarizes this point in Treitschke’s view of the State: 
Whilst in contracts between private persons there is at the base a moral power 
which controls the wills of the contracting parties, international contracts cannot 
be subject to this superior power, for there is nothing above the will of a State. This 
follows not only when the contract has been imposed by force, as the sequel of a 
war, but not less when it has been accepted by a free choice (Durkheim 1915, 10). 
Durkheim’s point is that while relations between individuals are guided or at least limited by 
ethical responsibility, no such mechanism exists in international relations. The Kantian 
cosmopolitanism of European morality, the great family which Germany has decided to leave 
behind, offered one way of solidifying a trans-national morality, which has subsequently been 
lost due to German aggression. Durkheim diagnoses the imminent threat to all of western 
civilization within Treitschke’s doctrine of the absolute State as the inevitability and necessity of 
war which necessarily accompanies this mentality. Because competing interests and rivalry will 
undoubtedly arise between States that are equally unrestrained by the moral power which 
compels contracting parties, the inevitable result will be war since the States cannot yield to the 
arbitration of any external authority. Moreover, those nations incapable of imposing their 
collective will onto other nations cannot rightfully be called States, he continues: 
Without war, the State is not even conceivable. Again the right of making war at 
its own will constitutes the essential quality of sovereignty. It is by this right that 
it is distinguished from all other human associations. When the State is no longer 
in a position to draw the sword at its will, it no longer deserves the name of State 
(Durkheim 1915, 12). 
Thus, in Treitschke’s view of the State, since there is no distinction between politics and war, the 
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essential quality of sovereignty is the power to make war. But Durkheim diagnoses the pathology 
of Treitschke’s absolutism as not only the inevitability of war, but in the sanctity with which 
warfare becomes invested. Warfare itself becomes sacred in two ways: first as a necessary 
condition for the existence of the State, which is in turn necessary for the survival of its citizens, 
and second as the actual embodiment of moral virtues. Durkheim explains, quoting Treitschke at 
length: 
War is not only inevitable, it is moral and sacred. It is sacred first because it 
represents a condition necessary to the existence of Slates, and without the State 
humanity cannot live. "Apart from the State, humanity cannot breathe". But it is 
sacred also, because it is the source of the highest moral virtues. It is war which 
compels men to master their natural egoism; it is war which raises them to the 
majesty of the supreme sacrifice, the sacrifice of self. By it, individual wills, instead 
of dissipating themselves in the pursuit of sordid ends, are concentrated on great 
causes, and "the petty personality of the individual is effaced and disappears 
before the vast perspective envisaged by the aspirations of the State". By war, "man 
tastes the joy of sharing with all his compatriots, learned or simple, in one and the 
same feeling, and whosoever has tasted that happiness never forgets all the 
sweetness and comfort that it yields". In a word, war connotes "a political 
idealism", which leads a man forward to surpass himself. Peace, on the contrary, 
is "the reign of materialism;" it is the triumph of personal interest over the spirit of 
devotion and sacrifice, of the mediocre and sordid over the noble life (Durkheim 
1915, 12-3). 
This inversion of morality functions in accord with the logic of Durkheim’s account of the sacred 
in that it makes war itself sacred and selfless while peace is seen as profane and egoistic. 
Durkheim could not have anticipated the degree to which war propaganda would be 
perfected during the twentieth century in order to ensure this moral inversion, although his work 
already explains the fundamental principles by which it will function. Following this “political 
idealism”, the State itself becomes a personality, which Durkheim notes is necessarily “a 
personality, imperious and ambitious, impatient of all subjection, even of the appearance of 
subjection : it is only really itself in proportion to the measure in which it belongs completely to 
itself” (13). The State’s inability to admit a power beyond itself, to close over into totality, forces 
the State to collapse all conception of power into the State itself. Weaker States are inevitably 
dominated as their dependence on others negates their absolute sovereignty. Durkheim 
continues: “A weak State naturally falls into dependence on another, and, in proportion as its 
sovereignty ceases to be complete, it ceases itself to be a State. Whence it follows that the element, 
which essentially constitutes a State, is Power. Der Staat ist Macht — this axiom, which constantly 
falls from the pen of Treitschke, dominates all his teaching” (14). This view that the State is Power 
is the underlying logic to all of Treitschke’s politics and ultimately collapses the distinction 
between politics and war at a fundamental level. This necessarily implies that smaller countries 
who lack the physical strength to defend and maintain themselves in conflict against their 
stronger or more aggressive neighbors, cannot properly be understood as States. Thus, powerful 
States who are “true” States by virtue of that power, have no moral or legal obligation to respect 
the rights of weaker non-States who have no legitimate claim to their own sovereignty. 
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Durkheim is especially interested in the way the State subordinates and must subordinate 
all morality to its own immediate necessities. One of the central claims of Durkheim’s pamphlet 
is that German nationalism in particular harbors a notable aversion to any morality which resides 
beyond the totality of the State. Any external or universal morality, such as Kantian 
cosmopolitanism, which could serve as a critique of the State, would be a threat to the absolute 
sovereignty which Treitschke insists is the essential characteristic of the State. Durkheim 
elaborates that the way that Treitschke responds to the potential challenge to the sovereignty of 
the State posed by morality is via a return to Machiavelli as a thinker who “did not hesitate to 
maintain that the State is not under the jurisdiction of the moral conscience, and should recognise 
no law but its own interest” (18). This view of the State as a closed totality, unbound by any 
external morality is rediscovered by Treitschke and other German nationalists seeking to solidify 
the absolute sovereignty of the State which is above all moral critique. Of course, acting in a moral 
way may well suit the interests of the State, to gain a reputation for trustworthiness might 
enhance the political power of the State, for example. But Durkheim makes clear that in this 
Treitschkean-Machiavellian conception of the relation of morality to the State, all morality serves 
the single purpose of reinforcing the State’s authority, which is to say, to increase the Power of 
the State. Increasing the Power of the State becomes the Supreme Good, above all else within the 
moral schema dictated by the exaggerated independence of the absolute State. Durkheim notes: 
Here we have a logical demonstration of the famous formula the German learns 
to repeat from his earliest childhood : Deutschland über alles; for the German there 
is nothing above the German State. The State has but one duty : to get as large a 
place in the sun as possible, trampling its rivals under foot in the process. The 
radical exclusion of all other ideals will rightly be regarded as monstrous 
(Durkheim 1915, 23). 
Because the absolute self-sufficiency and autonomy of the State can admit no higher power, this 
would seem to necessarily enter into conflict with any claim of universal values, especially those 
of religion when not subordinated to the State. Monotheism presents an especially problematic 
challenge since the God of monotheistic religions does not refer to a particular God of a tribe or a 
city, but to the God of the entire human race, a universal lawgiver and guarantor of an absolute 
morality which applies to all of humanity. It is in respect to this monotheistic conception of the 
divine that Durkheim writes: “Now the very idea of this God is alien to the mentality which we 
are studying” (24). While nationalists like Treitschke often claim divine or religious moral 
grounding of their political ideology, Durkheim views any admission of a divinity beyond the 
State as merely a “formal reservation.” 
For Durkheim, this denotes the total inversion of the sacred dimension of human life, the 
interconnectedness of social solidarity, which is entirely supplanted by the political objectives of 
the State. But this is not a suspension of morality in a Kierkegaardian sense of obligations to the 
State forcing us to renounce or suspend conflicting beliefs that we know to be morally right. 
Rather, this “political idealism” represents a new morality taking the place of the old morality, 
which is then cast as weak and decadent since it contributes nothing to the one true duty of the 
State, which is to increase its power. This new morality does not only guide the actions of the 
State at the international level, but also in terms of the regulation of the internal life of society. 
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Thus, Treitschke represents not only the elevation of the State over morality, but more 
fundamentally over civil society itself. Durkheim makes clear the source of this antagonism: 
To designate what we call the People as distinguished from the State, Treitschke 
and a number of other German theorists prefer the term Civil Society (die 
bürgerliche Gesellschaft). Civil Society includes everything in the nation which is not 
immediately connected with the State, the family, trade and industry, religion 
(when this is not a department of the State), science, art. All these forms of activity 
have this characteristic in common, that we embrace them voluntarily and 
spontaneously. They have their origin in the natural inclinations of man. Of our 
own free will we found a family, love our children, work to satisfy their material 
wants and our own, seek after truth, and enjoy aesthetic pleasures. Here we have 
a whole life which develops without the intervention of the State (Durkheim 1915, 
27).  
This voluntary spontaneity cannot be incorporated into the mechanism of the State, and thus 
presents a necessary antagonism. This civil society is what resists the pressure of the State’s 
single-minded pursuit of its own totalization. This realm of civil life which is prior to the State, 
and thus exists outside the purview of its authority, Durkheim describes as: 
… a mosaic of individuals and of separate groups pursuing divergent aims, and 
the whole formed by their agglomeration consequently lacks unity. The 
multiplicity of relations that connect individual with individual, or group with 
group do not constitute a naturally organised system. The resulting aggregate is 
not a personality; it is but an incoherent mass of dissimilar elements. [Treitschke] 
"Where is the common organ of Civil Society? There is none. It is obvious to 
everyone that Civil Society is not a precise and tangible thing like the State. A State 
has unity; we know it as such; it is not a mystic personality. Civil Society has no 
unity of will” (Durkheim 1915, 28, translation modified). 
As an “incoherent mass of dissimilar elements”, the diverse mosaic of civil society presents an 
antagonism with the absolute morality of the State, which demands unity, order and organization 
above all else. Because civil society lacks a kind of spontaneous harmony or the authoritarian 
imposed harmony enforced by the apparatus of the State, each of its competing interests will 
invariably enter into conflict, resulting in the chaos of disorder, which is anathema to the 
objectives of the State. The State, in turn, must inevitably resort to coercive action and 
commanding obedience to impose order, making obedience to the State the first civic duty. This 
does not require the coercion of belief, for Treitschke, merely the coercion of action, since the State 
has no interest in the private lives of citizens, only external obedience to the formal law. He quotes 
from Treitschke: “[The State] says: what you think is a matter of indifference to me; but you must 
obey. Progress has been made when the silent obedience of citizens is reinforced by internal and 
well considered acquiescence; but this acquiescence is not essential” (32). The silent obedience of 
the masses, yielding to the power of the State not out of agreement but out of coercion, supplants 
moral solidarity and fraternity. Since the first task of politics, in Treitschke’s view, is to assert its 
own Power, this requires the overcoming of mere sentimentality and aversion to harshness on 
the part of the sovereign. Durkheim further quotes, with evident distaste, Treitschke’s view that 
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“Politics cannot be carried on without harshness; that is why women understand nothing about 
them” (33). 
It is this logic of Germany Above All, the logic of the State above morality, that allows for 
unrivaled levels of brutality, as Durkheim describes German conduct up to that point during the 
First World War. Durkheim notes: 
… the individual atrocities committed by the soldiery are but the methodical 
application of these principles and rules. Thus the whole system is homogeneous 
and logical; a pre-determined concept of the State is expressed in rules of conduct 
laid down by the military authority, and these rules are, in their turn, translated 
into action by the individual (Durkheim 1915, 39). 
At the level of individual action, atrocities are carried out not out of any particular malice or 
hatred, but out of a systematic and methodological application of the self-sufficient mentality of 
the State. Durkheim points to a connection between the State placing itself above both morality 
and civil society in such a way as the actions of its agents (specifically soldiers in this case) cannot 
be judged by any logic external to the State. Put another way, if the only good is the good of the 
State, moral agency must be oriented around the single goal the State can have, which is to 
increase its power. Thus, overthrowing weaker States, who are not “real” States in the sense they 
are incapable of exerting their own Power, is the inevitable outcome of this radical autonomy. By 
orienting all citizenship around the goal of increasing the power of the State, Treitschke opposes 
the very concept of nationality in terms of the collective of social groups living under a set of 
established laws. Powerful States, in pursuit of greater power, desire to impose order on these 
non-States, via coercion rather than their consent. This, for Durkheim, explains German 
aggression: “Hence the passion of Germany for conquest and annexation. She cares so little what 
men may feel or desire. All she asks is that they should submit to the law of the conqueror, and 
she herself will see to it that it is obeyed” (40). 
Durkheim concludes the essay by making clear that the fundamental pathology of this 
mentality is not simply collective insanity or brutal sadism, but rather lies in defining the State 
via “a morbid hypertrophy of the will, a kind of will-mania” (44). For Durkheim, this idealism of 
exaggerated sovereignty leads to the inability of Germany to accept the legitimacy of 
international law, of the right of “lesser” States to exist, or even accept the existence of “equal” 
States which might serve as rivals. This produces a “frenzied race to power” (43) which will 
inevitably oblige Germany to attempt to outgrow any possible challenge which might come from 
any external forces. This is the task set forth by the political idealism that Durkheim describes, 
but remains impossible to realize for the individual. Rather, it is only achievable through the 
State, in Treitschke’s formulation, due to its unique ability to harness these disparate individual 
wills in order to direct them to the “supreme end” (45). Durkheim then pronounces the 
philosophical underpinnings of the German mentality: 
The State is the sole concrete and historic form possible to the Superman of whom 
Nietzsche was the prophet and harbinger, and the German State must put forth all 
its strength to become this Superman. The German State must be “über Allés” 
(above all). Superior to all private wills, individual or collective, superior to the 
moral laws themselves, without any law save that imposed by itself, it will be able 
Eland and de Pontes                 disClosure, Vol. 29: Populism 
 
32 
 
to triumph over all resistance and rule by constraint, when it cannot secure 
voluntary acceptance (Durkheim 1915, 45). 
This absolute superiority of the State, above all other individual or collective wills, admits no 
possibility of the critique which emanates from exteriority. By subordinating all wills, even 
morality itself, to the one task of increasing its power, the State not only becomes a personality 
characterized by its desire for unity, order and organization, but it becomes the only possible 
concrete personality. 
The association of the German mentality of aggressive nationalism to the philosophy of 
Nietzsche is, at best, a highly selective reading of Nietzsche’s concept of will to power, and must 
necessarily ignore Nietzsche’s critique of mass culture and the herd mentality that would 
subordinate individual wills to any kind of collective will, including the State. Clearly Durkheim 
is not offering a particularly nuanced reading of Nietzsche as a social theorist, but this does reveal 
an important dimension of Durkheim’s reading of Treitschke as the culmination not only of a 
particular political ideology but more fundamentally as the conclusion of a particular line of 
philosophical thinking. This mentality, which Durkheim associates with both Nietzsche and 
Machiavelli, rests on the subordination of all individual wills to a general will for the sake of 
increasing the power of the State. 
Ultimately, Durkheim concludes his essay optimistically, noting: “When all the nations 
whose existence it threatens or disturbs — and they are legion — combine against it, it will be 
unable to resist them, and the world will be set free” (47) That optimistic view, in 1915, could not 
have anticipated the events of the next three years of the First World War, let alone the horrors 
that played out over the rest of the first half of the twentieth century and still persist in similar 
forms of “political idealism” well into the twenty-first century. 
“Elementary Feelings” and the Degenerate Germanic Ideal of Man 
Durkheim’s analysis of Treitschke’s nationalism takes on renewed relevance when we 
observe that contemporary forms of authoritarian populism have merely substituted Donald 
Trump’s “America First” for Oswald Mosley’s “Britain First” or Jair Bolsonaro’s “Brazil Above 
All, God Above Everyone” for the “Germany Above All” embodied by Treitschke. But in order 
to understand the deep pathology at play within the xenophobic and jingoistic rhetoric deployed 
by these authoritarian figures, which has historically been deployed with extraordinary success 
by nationalistic populist movements, we can turn to the work of Emmanuel Levinas. Levinas, 
like Heller, lost much of his family in the Holocaust and his work bares the mark of his own 
internment in a Nazi prison camp. Levinas’s work is especially important for this task because 
he addresses politics at the level of underlying philosophical commitments, specifically focusing 
on the way philosophy has come to be singularly consumed with questions of ontology, which 
has left it vulnerable to this particular pathology. Levinas’s work also emphasizes, as did 
Durkheim’s analysis of Treitschke, that political manifestations of this ideology cannot be 
addressed purely at the level of political rationality but must rather engage it as a matter of social 
metaphysics.  
The influence of Durkheim’s thought on Levinas’s phenomenological project has been 
thoroughly documented by Howard Caygill in his 2002 book Levinas and the Political, which 
stresses the role of Durkheim’s conception of the sacred on Levinas’s later phenomenology. 
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Caygill relies largely on the widely circulated interviews with Philippe Nemo from 1981, in which 
Levinas addresses not only his mature philosophical positions but the range of influences which 
contributed to his unique approach to philosophical questions. These interviews represent an 
especially important moment in Levinas’s reflection on his own thought and are an indispensable 
resource for interpreting the political and social context of the pluralism evoked in the conclusion 
of Totality and Infinity. 
One of the important characteristics of the largely informal interviews, which were 
subsequently collected and republished as Ethics and Infinity, is that Levinas makes a clear 
connection between his metaphysical project and the broader social context to which that project 
attempts to respond. This brings him to address the social dimension of his philosophical thought 
in much greater detail than in his more formal philosophical writings. It is in this context that in 
response to Nemo’s question “Do you put the sociological thought of a Durkheim on the same 
level as the properly philosophical thought of a Bergson?,” Levinas offers effusive praise for the 
famed sociologist: 
Apparently, Durkheim was inaugurating an experimental sociology. But his work 
also appeared as a ‘rational sociology,’ as an elaboration of the fundamental 
categories of the social, as what one would call today an ‘eidetic of society,’ 
beginning with the leading idea that the social does not reduce to the sum of 
individual psychologies. Durkheim, a metaphysician! The idea that the social is 
the very order of the spiritual, a new plot in being above the animal and human 
psychism; the level of ‘collective representations’ defined with vigor and which 
opens up the dimension of spirit in the individual life itself, where the individual 
alone comes to be recognized and even redeemed. In Durkheim there is, in a sense, 
a theory of ‘levels of being,’ of the irreducibility of these levels to one another, an 
idea which acquires its full meaning within the Husserlian and Heideggerian 
context (Levinas 1985, 26-27). 
That Levinas considers Durkheim to be a great philosophical thinker on par with the titans of the 
philosophical canon can help us understand how to deploy his work practically in the context of 
populist exclusionary nationalism that occupies us here. Levinas even seems to suggest that he 
remained skeptical as to whether the phenomenological approach of his mentors could function 
without the import of concepts more accessible via Durkheim’s experimental sociology. For 
Levinas, Durkheim provides the foundation for a critique of phenomenology itself by insisting 
on the irreducibility of levels of sociality, that is, on the irreducibility of social life to the actions 
or consciousness of individual subjects. It is exactly this irreducibility, the radical alterity which 
cannot be accounted for within the frameworks of Husserlian or Heideggerian phenomenology, 
that Durkheim’s work lays bare. This helps clarify the context in which Levinas evokes Durkheim 
against Heidegger in Totality and Infinity, when he utilizes Durkheim’s social metaphysics as a 
way to escape from Heidegger’s solipsism. Levinas notes: 
… for Heidegger intersubjectivity is a coexistence, a we prior to the I and the other, 
a neutral intersubjectivity. The face to face both announces a society, and permits 
the maintaining of a separated I. Durkheim already in one respect went beyond 
this optical interpretation of the relation with the other in characterizing society 
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by religion. I relate to the Other only across Society, which is not simply a 
multiplicity of individuals or objects ; I relate to the Other who is not simply a part 
of a Whole, nor a singular instance of a concept. To reach the Other through the 
social is to reach him through the religious. Durkheim thus gives an indication of 
a transcendence other than that of the objective (Levinas 1979, 68). 
Levinas will go on to oppose Durkheim’s reduction of religion to observable and quantifiable 
practices and rituals, which is necessitated by the positivistic methodology of his experimental 
sociology. But Durkheim’s central insight which Levinas identifies and praises in Totality and 
Infinity, and again 20 years later in the Nemo interviews, is that this social metaphysics avoids 
the solipsistic trappings of existential phenomenology by viewing the social as beyond the scope 
of ontology. 
As such, it might not be surprising that when faced with Heidegger’s embrace of National 
Socialism in 1933, Levinas evoked terminology drawn directly from Durkheim’s conception of 
“elementary forms” in accounting for “elementary feelings” which had been awakened by 
populist discourse directed at the German people. As one of Heidegger’s most thoroughly 
devoted disciples, Levinas was especially shaken by his mentor’s political commitment. But while 
his work never addresses Heidegger’s politics commitment directly, his entire philosophical 
project can be read as an attempt to rehabilitate thinking itself in such a way as to avoid its 
vulnerability to the particular pathology that engulfed the German people and even Heidegger 
himself. To this end, the crucial text that provides the key context to Levinas’ later formal work 
is his 1934 “Reflections on the Philosophy of Hitlerism.” This text is especially relevant for our 
purposes here as it draws out the crucial connection between the pathology diagnosed by 
Durkheim in Treitschke’s nationalism and the particular manifestation of that nationalism two 
decades later under the banner of National Socialism, which has emerged again in our time under 
various terms for authoritarian populism. 
The short text of Levinas’s reflections is remarkable for a number of reasons. With the 
benefit of historical hindsight, it is easy to underestimate the penetrating nature of Levinas’ 
perception of the pathology of Hitlerism early in its development. At a point in history in which 
western democracies were unsure what to make of the emerging politics of fascism, and a full 
decade before the full extent of the horrors of the Holocaust began to come to light, Hitler was 
widely seen to be a somewhat aggressive politician fighting against the political and economic 
woes of the Weimar Republic, not unlike many aspiring tyrants of our own contemporary 
political climate such as Orbán. In the same sense as current movements in nationalist or 
authoritarian populism are commonly perceived, at the time there was no general sense of 
urgency as the horrors that would come to light after the war were unprecedented and 
unimaginable. Even as the nation-States of western Europe pursued a doomed strategy of 
appeasement, naively hoping for the “Peace for our time” which would be prematurely declared 
by Neville Chamberlain in 1938, Levinas immediately perceived the threat and underlying 
pathology within the rise of Hitlerism. 
Still drawing heavily on Heidegger’s language from Being and Time, Levinas writes in his 
Reflections on Hitlerism: “Time, which is a condition of human existence, is above all a condition 
that is irreparable. The fait accompli, swept along by a fleeing present, forever evades man's 
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control, but weighs heavily on his destiny” (Levinas 1990, 65). Levinas emphatically opposes the 
subordination of individual freedom within the logic of Hitlerism, but also outlines the 
problematic conception of freedom within liberal politics as placing “the human spirit on a plane 
that is superior to reality, and so creates a gulf between man and the world” (66). This radical 
division of man and world is at the heart of what Levinas will go on to denounce as “the Germanic 
ideal of man” which is the necessary framework of Hitlerism’s false promise of sincerity and 
authenticity (70). Levinas’s denunciation of this degenerate Germanic ideal is undertaken in the 
name of defending civilization itself. He notes that under the spell of this degenerate Germanic 
ideal, “Civilization is invaded by everything that is not authentic, by a substitute that is put at the 
service of fashion and of various interests… Such a society loses living contact with its true ideal 
of freedom and accepts degenerate forms of the ideal” (70). 
At the core of the short essay we find a compelling case against not only the politics and 
philosophy of Hitlerism, but Levinas’s attempt to describe a conception of the social which 
opposes this degenerate Germanic ideal. Skepticism and nihilism are attributed to this same 
mentality and are seen as the awakening of elementary feelings and “secret nostalgia” within the 
German soul. Levinas would later write, in a 1990 prefatory note to the article, that his interest in 
writing these reflections in 1934 was to oppose the tendency of understanding the rise of 
Hitlerism as some sort of collective madness or anomaly within human reason, but rather to 
expose the “elemental Evil into which we can be led by logic and against which Western 
philosophy had not sufficiently insured itself” (63). Clearly in 1934 Levinas could not have 
anticipated the scale this elemental Evil would reach over the next decade, but his early account 
of Hitlerism already anticipated the way in which the degenerate Germanic ideal necessarily 
undermines “the very humanity of man” (71). The fundamental core of Hitlerian racist ideology 
is not primarily anti-Semitism, but rather a skepticism towards “[a]ny rational assimilation or 
mystical communion between spirits that is not based on a community of blood…” (70). For 
Levinas, the core of racism lies in accepting the principle that “[u]niversality must give way to 
the idea of expansion…” (Levinas 1990, 70) If we are to read Levinas’ work as an attempt to create 
an ethical response to the problem of evil, as suggested by Richard Bernstein (2004), it is important 
to understand that the specific kind of evil that Levinas opposes is exactly what he refers to here 
as the degenerate Germanic ideal. While his earlier work did not elaborate this critique in the 
context of opposition to Heideggerian ontology, there is a clear overlap in the way he views this 
Germanic ideal as the negation of social pluralism and Heidegger’s ontology as the negation of 
metaphysical pluralism. 
Levinas’s article on Hitlerism, which we should remember was written only 19 years after 
Durkheim’s pamphlet on Treitschke, offers both condemnation of the rise of fascism as well as a 
lamentation of liberalism’s failure to resist the pathological Germany mentality. Levinas 
demonstrates a remarkable interest in the political reaction to the fundamental social changes 
which accompany the shift from pre-modern to modern society, or to use Durkheim’s technical 
vocabulary, in the shift from mechanical solidarity to organic solidarity. Levinas does not 
approach this question as a strictly sociological or political problem, but rather something which 
is pervasive in the philosophical foundations of all modern society. Liberalism and fascism are 
addressed as political movements derived from the modern conception of the human subject, 
which is to say they both seek to understand the human condition strictly in terms of separation, 
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or more specifically, in terms of their separateness from one another. Levinas notes: 
The whole philosophical and political thought of modern times tends to place the 
human spirit on a plane that is superior to reality, and so creates a gulf between 
man and the world. It makes it impossible to apply the categories of the physical 
world to the spirituality of reason, and so locates the ultimate foundation of the 
spirit outside the brutal world and the implacable history of concrete existence 
(Levinas 1990, 66). 
For Levinas, Hitlerism signifies a rediscovering of a primal aspect of human existence that he 
calls, in terms that echo Durkheim’s analysis of Treitschke, “the secret nostalgia within the 
German soul” and represents “an awakening of elementary feelings [sentiments élémentaires]” 
which “questions the very principles of a civilization” (64). This stirring of primal drives, 
however, is not simply a matter of a return to a more primitive human nature as Freud would 
have it, but rather is itself a product of social forces. Again, it is crucial to understand Levinas’s 
philosophical analysis of Hitlerism in light of his affirmation in the 1990 prefatory note that 
western ontological philosophy has left us unequipped to respond to the barbarism of this 
elemental evil, especially in regards to Heidegger’s project of fundamental ontology. 
This interest in “elemental forms”, both in the prefatory note and the original article, 
indicate profound connection to Durkheim at the core of Levinas’s understanding of the political 
sphere. Levinas repeatedly evokes Durkheim’s phraseology in referring to the elementary force 
[force élémentaire] of the simplistic [primaire] philosophy of Hitler, and the way it awakened these 
elementary feelings [sentiments élémentaires] within the German people. The way in which these 
repeated references derive their terminology from Durkheim’s examination of “elementary 
forms” has been extensively explored by Caygill, emphasizing Levinas’s insistence on the 
paganistic religiosity at the core of social life within Germany. Levinas notes: “For these 
elementary feelings harbor a philosophy. They express a soul's principal attitude towards the 
whole of reality and its own destiny. They predetermine or prefigure the meaning of the 
adventure that the soul will face in the world” (64). By returning to the language of Durkheim’s 
social metaphysics which he had encountered prior to studying under Husserl and Heidegger, 
Levinas attempts to pronounce a fundamental conflict of modern society of which Hitlerism is 
merely one instantiation. The philosophy of Hitlerism, he is clear to point out, cannot be reduced 
to the philosophy of Hitlerians alone, but necessarily draws on the entire western philosophical 
tradition leading up to that point. While Levinas required another 30 years to develop his critique 
of ontology in Totality and Infinity, it is clear that he was already engaging at a fundamental level 
with the themes that would go on to motivate his work throughout the rest of his life. 
Conclusion 
One of the defining features of contemporary forms of populism is a distinct attempt to 
appeal to nationalist sentiment. Nationalism, as the antithesis of globalism or universalism, rests 
on a conception of the state as inherently self-contained and isolated from its neighbors in a 
radical way. The most recent rise of authoritarian populism is fundamentally inseparable from 
the constant appeals to national heritage or cultural identity that are declared to be under siege 
by nefarious forces of globalist hegemony. It is unsurprising that this global hegemony is often 
presented in anti-Semitic tones, often focusing specifically on the role of George Soros in global 
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politics. This paper has argued that we can understand the dynamics at play in this emergence of 
nationalist identity politics by examining the way this pathology has been diagnosed and 
addressed in the sociological tradition by Durkheim and in the philosophical tradition by 
Levinas. 
Heller’s observation on the difficulty in identifying Orbán as a populist, with which we 
began this investigation, rests on a conception of populism which distances its philosophical 
meaning from its historical manifestations. In illustrating that while Orbán uses nationalistic 
vocabulary and rhetoric, to mobilize hatred against foreigners, Heller remains clearly aware that 
these are traditional methods that authoritarian populists have long used to gain and maintain 
power. But, continuing her analysis, Heller notes that it is difficult even to describe Orbán as 
“right-wing” because his naked pursuit of power is not beholden to any political ideology beyond 
his own ambition and lust for increased power. But this is crucial to understanding the populist 
mechanism at play in the work of an aristocrat like Treitschke, who deploys anti-Semitic 
nationalist rhetoric instrumentally to achieve a particular end, which is increasing the power of 
the State. Levinas’ work helps us understand not only how this rhetoric is deployed in a specific 
attempt to manifest resentment by drawing on the “elementary feelings” of tribalistic 
nationalism, but also how this degenerate mentality is deeply rooted within western philosophy 
itself. 
Perhaps the most compelling aspect of Durkheim’s analysis of Treitschke, at least for the 
context of contemporary questions of populism, is the necessary union of social solidarity and 
consequent political forms of exclusionary nationalism. To be clear, Durkheim’s interest in 
Treitschke is not limited to a strictly political conception of the State, but rather addresses the 
interplay between social hegemony and the concrete political incarnation of this phenomenon as 
the unrestrained sovereignty of nationalism. While it might be tempting to exclude this social 
order and draw a direct connection between the State’s lust for power and the fascist movements 
of the twentieth century, that would necessarily risk ignoring work of nationalists like Treitschke 
whose work predates fascism by decades. This is precisely why Durkheim’s sociological analysis 
of pre-fascist nationalism is so vital to the current historical moment as contemporary populist 
movements demand their disparate nation-states abandon international accords and reject all 
forms of solidarity other than “blood and soil.”        
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